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“ACTIVE” VERSUS
“REASONABLE” EFFORTS: THE
DUTIES TO REUNIFY THE FAMILY
UNDER THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT AND THE ALASKA
CHILD IN NEED OF AID
STATUTES
MARK ANDREWS*
In this Article, the author analyzes recent decisions of the
Alaska Supreme Court pertaining to the duties imposed
upon the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services
to make efforts to reunify the family after a child is taken
into State custody. The article analyzes the distinction between “active efforts” as required under the federal Indian
Child Welfare Act and “reasonable efforts” as required under Alaska’s Child in Need of Aid statutes. The Article begins with a discussion of these statutory duties, and continues with a summary of the legal history and development of
the two legislative “efforts” standards. The author argues
that despite a few aberrations, the Alaska Supreme Court
has consistently applied a single standard for both active
and reasonable efforts.
I. THE PARENT AND THE SYSTEM
When a state agency takes a child into custody as a result of
abuse or neglect, the child’s parent has a set of rights unique in
American law. The parent has a status similar to that of a defendant, and yet the parent is entitled to substantial help from the
State before his or her parental rights are altered or lost. Before
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the State may permanently separate the parent and child, the State,
through the Department of Health and Social Services, has a duty
to try to reunify them. The substance of that duty is the subject of
this Article.
The child’s ethnicity changes the level of the State’s duty.
When the child in custody is an Indian, the State has an affirmative
1
duty to make “active efforts” to reunify the family. When the
2
child is non-Indian, the State must make “reasonable efforts.”
These two phrases, “active efforts” and “reasonable efforts,” embody duties that touch on important rights of parents. However,
differences between the two are rarely addressed. This Article will
compare them, arguing that the Alaska Supreme Court has applied
a central principle that unifies both standards.
3
In R.J.M. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services, a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the child protection stat4
utes against a challenge that they were void for vagueness, one
particular phrase by the court stands out: the statutes “limit[] intervention to cases in which the State can prove an ongoing, objectively demonstrated failure to provide basic parental care that re5
flects unwillingness to serve as a parent.” The Alaska Constitution
is not the source of “efforts” requirements. However, R.J.M. articulated the rule that the court has actually applied in interpreting
the statutory “efforts” requirements in children’s cases. The court
had earlier held that the right of a parent to the custody and com6
panionship of his or her child is one of the most basic civil liberties.
Before parental rights are altered or lost, the trial court must assure itself that it is relying on accurate, objective information relevant to the question of this particular adult’s willingness to parent
this particular child; then the case may proceed safely to the serious
judgment of whether parent and child must be separated.
The “efforts” finding thus becomes part of the picture that the
court uses to compare parental conduct to the statute’s requirements. Do the actions of the Department of Health and Social
Services (“the Department”) sufficiently reduce the possibility that
a decision to alter a parent’s rights will not be based upon subjective impressions, or on temporary or incidental behavior? Do the
Department’s actions reliably allow the court to predict future pa-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (Michie 2000).
973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999).
R.J.M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999).
Id. at 87.
In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 279 (Alaska 1991).
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rental behavior? The distinctions between “active” and “reasonable” efforts build upon these fundamental analytical principles.
The “efforts” requirements originate in federal law, but federal law does not define either of the two. Alaska has judicially
adopted three substantive distinctions between the “active” and
“reasonable” requirements. First, as the plain meaning of “active
efforts” implies, the State must make an affirmative effort to offer
programs and services to facilitate reunification; simply stating the
need for the parent to take advantage of and making the parent
aware of such services is insufficient. Second, “active efforts” is a
more stringent standard than “reasonable efforts.” Finally, there is
a distinctly Indian character to active efforts; therefore, the State
must search for reunification services uniquely offered by the Indian community itself.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “EFFORTS” REQUIREMENTS
In Alaska, the Department of Health and Social Services is the
executive agency that assumes custody of abused or neglected chil7
dren. The Department must show the trial court at every important stage of an Alaska child dependency proceeding that the State
is fulfilling its duty to make active or reasonable efforts.
8
Pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) the Department may not place an Indian child in foster care until the Department has made active efforts to provide “remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the In9
dian family.” Emergencies are the major exception; in such cases
the agency may take a child into custody “under applicable state
10
law” without first showing active or reasonable efforts.
If the child is non-Indian, the Department must make reasonable efforts “designed to prevent out-of-home placement of the
child or to enable the safe return of the child to the family home,
11
The “reasonable efforts” requirement is
when appropriate.”
12
However, in contrast to the
taken directly from federal law.
ICWA, other federal law does not impose the efforts requirement
directly. Rather, the state plan for dependent children must in-

7. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.05.060 (Michie 2000).
8. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2000).
9. Id. § 1912(d) (2000); see also C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs.,
18 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Alaska 2001).
10. 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (2000).
11. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086(a) (Michie 2000).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994).
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clude reasonable reunification efforts in order for the State to
qualify for federal funds.13
There is no federal requirement of active efforts findings at
specific stages of the Indian child dependency case. However,
Alaska court rules require “active efforts” findings at the same
points where the Alaska statutes require “reasonable efforts”
findings: at the temporary custody hearing, when the court approves an out-of-home placement, in a temporary disposition order
after the child is adjudicated as a child in need of aid, at disposition,
14
at permanency hearings, and in orders terminating parental rights.
In short, the Department must show that it is fulfilling the efforts
tests at every significant stage of the proceeding.
The practical effect of requiring such findings is uncertain. A
1996 survey of children’s cases found that judicial officers touched
only briefly upon the “efforts” issue, and usually checked the appropriate box on a form order rather than writing out separate
15
findings. In nearly five hundred cases reviewed for the study,
fewer than one percent had a finding of “no reasonable efforts” at
16
some point in the case. The Department’s awareness that it must
report its activities to the court may have made the agency more
mindful of fulfilling its duties; appellate case law consistently shows
that the Department makes a variety of reunification efforts before
parental rights are terminated.
III. ALASKA LAW IN THE 1970S: A “NO EFFORTS” STANDARD
A. Case Law Through 1976
Historically, the legislature, not the judiciary, has led the way
in creating substantive rights and duties in child dependency cases.
Before passage of federal legislation that mandated efforts to reunify families, no such requirement existed under Alaska law. The
Alaska Supreme Court has never created an affirmative duty to reunify families in the absence of a statutory directive or court rule.

13. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994). The distinction between a substantive rule
and a precondition for funding is important. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S.
347 (1992) (stating that as an appropriations statute, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994), creates no private cause of action based on allegations of a failure to make reasonable efforts).
14. Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) R. 10.1(a); 10.1(b); 15(f)(1),(2); 17(c);
17.2(f)(1); and (18)(c)(2)(A), (B), respectively.
15. TERESA W. CARNS ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE
COURT PROCESS FOR ALASKA’S CHILDREN IN NEED OF AID 98-100 (1996).
16. Id. at 100.
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At the beginning of the 1970s, the overriding goal in child dependency proceedings was to rescue the child, which meant re17
moval from the abusive home. Family preservation and reunification concerns were essentially nonexistent. In 1971, the legislature
strengthened protections for the child by enacting new legislation,
18
but did not require family reunification efforts. Under the new
legislation, before an agency can petition to terminate parental
rights, “it shall offer protective social services and pursue all other
19
reasonable means of protecting the child.” The law created a
provision for a voluntary agreement between the Department and
the parent, whereby the parent could have the child placed in state
20
custody and returned at any time. However, the law created no
Departmental duty to reunify the child with the parent.
21
In a 1971 case, In re E.M.D., the Alaska Supreme Court limited the Department’s ability to institutionalize a child to only
those situations involving categories of civil custody authorized by
state statute. The court noted that “benevolent social theory . . .
does not furnish justification for dispensing with constitutional
22
safeguards.” Despite the limited nature of the ruling, it set a tone
the supreme court has followed since: the Department will be held
to its powers and duties as defined by statute. Despite a judicial
reluctance to create rights in the family or duties for the Department, the court is willing, within the boundaries of the statutes, to
examine Departmental actions closely and to give substantive
meaning to the rights and duties created there.
Reunification, however, was not a legislative goal at this time.
Departmental attempts to reunify parent and child were the result
23
of stipulation, not legislation or court decision. In the 1976 case of
In re E.J.(T.), the supreme court left open the possibility that the
24
trial court could impose a duty to reunify as a matter of discretion.
In re E.J.(T.) highlights the differences between child dependency cases in the 1970s and today. Today, a case plan must be
aimed toward reunification, even if it is unlikely to succeed. In re
E.J.(T.), however, observed “that a rehabilitation program is not a
common practice in the trial courts absent approval by a represen17. See id. at 2.
18. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.030 (Michie 2000).
19. Id. § 47.17.030(d) (Michie 2000).
20. Id. § 47.10.230 (repealed 1996) (current version at § 47.14.100(c)).
21. 490 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1971).
22. Id. at 660 (citation omitted).
23. See In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1201-02 (Alaska 1976); see also In re B.J.,
530 P.2d 747, 748 (Alaska 1975).
24. In re E.J.(T.), 557 P.2d 1128, 1132 (Alaska 1976).
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tative of the State.”25 In In re E.J.(T.), both the State and the
26
guardian ad litem opposed such a plan, and it was neither adopted
27
by the trial court nor required by the supreme court.
In the same year that In re E.J.(T.) was decided, perhaps signaling dissatisfaction with the existing child dependency system,
the Alaska Supreme Court referred favorably to the idea of reunification efforts: “Children should, if at all possible, be maintained
in their homes with society providing the supportive services neces28
sary to keep the family together.” The court offered an inventory
of such services, including “homemaker training, child care, job
placement, income supplements, alcohol rehabilitation, psychologi29
The court cited and
cal counseling, and psychiatric therapy.”
quoted at length the family preservation and reunification statutes
30
of four other states. As will be seen, when the Alaska legislature
defined “reasonable efforts” in 1998, its definition reflected the su31
preme court’s 1976 inventory of services.
B. 1976 Legislative Changes
In 1976 the Alaska State Legislature took a tentative step to32
ward recognizing the value of family preservation. The new state
33
policy removed the child from her parents “only as a last resort.”
However, the statute created no affirmative duties for the Department to fulfill before removal. The law outlined only general purposes, gave no specific directives to the executive agencies and created no sanctions for failure to follow the statute.
The Alaska Supreme Court interpreted this new provision no
more expansively than the general provisions of the statute. In the
34
1981 case of E.A. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services the
court acknowledged that Alaska Statutes section 47.05.060 re35
quired the State to “preserve and strengthen the family ties.” But
in keeping with the generalized nature of the Department’s duties,
the court noted that the Department fulfilled its obligation to pre25. Id. at 1132-33.
26. Id. at 1133.
27. Id.
28. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d at 1199.
29. Id. at 1199 n.29.
30. Id. (citing the statutes of California, Minnesota, Colorado and Vermont).
31. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.990(9) (Michie 2000); see In re S.D. Jr., 549 P.2d at
1199 n.29.
32. ALASKA STAT. § 47.05.060 (Michie 2000).
33. Id.
34. 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981).
35. Id. at 1213 n.5.
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serve the family “by offering counseling and supervision to E.A. on
numerous occasions.”36 The court then remanded the case to determine whether there was clear and convincing evidence that
E.A.’s conduct initially leading to termination proceedings would
37
continue if the court decided against termination. Thus, in 1981,
the bare offer of services was sufficient; no further requirements
stated that the services be actively promoted or reasonably related
38
to the parents’ problem. The contrast between the standard under E.A. and the Department’s duties today could scarcely be
greater.
Thus, as the Indian Child Welfare Act was under consideration, Alaska law favored, but did not require, some set of efforts
toward preserving the child’s home.
IV. THE “EFFORTS” REQUIREMENTS TAKE SHAPE
A. Active Efforts
1. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (“ICWA”). The
39
ICWA established an affirmative state duty to make active efforts
to reunify Indian families. It addressed the high frequency of removal of Indian children from Indian homes, the many placements
of those children with non-Indian families and the states’ consistent
failure to recognize and give credence to Indian cultural practices.
Requiring active efforts to reunify Indian families, among other
guarantees, was the cure.
The pertinent subsection of the ICWA states:
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under state law shall
satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have
40
proved unsuccessful.
41

This requirement complemented congressional findings.
After
recognizing both the importance of children to the “continued exis42
tence and integrity of Indian tribes” and the federal trustee inter36. Id.
37. Id. at 1213.
38. E.A. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services involved an Indian child,
but the termination of parental rights became final before the effective date of the
Indian Child Welfare Act.
39. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2000).
40. Id. § 1912(d).
41. Id. § 1901.
42. Id. § 1901(3).
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est in protecting Indian children,43 the United States Congress
found
that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in nonIndian foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and
that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings . . . have often failed to recognize
the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and 44social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.

The next section of the statute states the federal purpose, in light of
these problems: “[I]t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
45
families.” The requirement of active efforts promoted this policy.
2. Active Efforts Defined. The Alaska Supreme Court has
held that “no pat formula” distinguishes active from non-active ef46
forts. The Indian Child Welfare Act does not define active efforts. However, state court rulings have drawn three distinctions
between the “active” and “reasonable” standards.
First, an active efforts standard requires that the State provide
services. Congress had observed the general lack of state efforts to
provide even those reunification services that were nominally
available. As one remedy to preserve Indian families, Congress
expected that such services would actually be made available. The
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee reported:
[25 U.S.C. section 1912(d)] provides that a party seeking foster
care placement or termination of parental rights involving an Indian child must satisfy the court that active efforts have been
made to provide assistance designed to prevent the breakup of
Indian families. The Committee is advised that most State laws
require public or private agencies involved in child placements
to resort to remedial measures prior to initiating placement or
termination proceedings, but that these services are rarely provided. This subsection imposes a federal requirement in that re47
gard with respect to Indian children and families.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 1901(4)-(5).
45. Id. § 1902.
46. A.A. v. State, 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999).
47. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 7530,
7545, quoted in K.N. v. State, 856 P.2d 468, 476 (Alaska 1993).
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The Alaska Supreme Court followed this legislative history in A.M.
v. State48 (“A.M. I”) and adopted this definition:
Passive efforts are where a plan is drawn up and the client must
develop his or her own resources towards bringing it to fruition.
Active efforts, the intent of the drafters of the Act, is where the
state caseworker takes the client through the steps of the plan
rather than requiring that the plan be performed on its own. For
instance, rather than requiring that a client find a job, acquire
new housing, and terminate a relationship with what is perceived
to be a boyfriend who is a bad influence, the Indian Child Welfare Act would require that the caseworker help the client develop job and parenting skills necessary to retain custody of her
49
child.

The court has reaffirmed this standard several times.50
The Alaska Supreme Court has disapproved of Departmental
claims that it satisfies its “active efforts” duty when the agency
51
writes a case plan and encourages the parent to follow it. In A.M.
I the parent was incarcerated and the chance of fulfilling the case
52
plan was low. The court noted, “The State simply claims that, by
preparing a reunification plan and encouraging [the father] to seek
services available within the institution, it fulfilled its duty of mak53
ing active efforts to provide remedial services.” The court refused
54
to hold that this effort constituted active efforts.

48. 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995) (“A.M. I”), appeal after remand, 945 P.2d 296
(Alaska 1997) (“A.M. II”), overruled in part on other grounds by In re S.A., 912
P.2d 1235, 1241 (Alaska 1996), legislatively overruled on other grounds by 1998
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 99 § 1(b)(2)(B), and later appeal sub nom. N.A. v. State,
Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001).
49. Id. at 826 n.12 (quoting CRAIG DORSAY, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ACT AND LAWS AFFECTING INDIAN JUVENILES MANUAL 157-58 (1984)). Dorsay
quoted a letter from attorney Bert Hirsch, one of the drafters of the ICWA.
50. N.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597, 602-03 (Alaska
2001); C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214, 1219 n.17 (Alaska
2001); A.A. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska
1999).
51. A.M. I, 891 P.2d at 826-27.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 827.
54. Id. The court’s response to such testimony in the context of “reasonable
efforts” is uncertain. When the court reviewed similar testimony in the context of
“reasonable efforts,” it seemed inclined to accept identification and referral as actions that supported the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts. M.W. v.
State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141, 1146 (Alaska 2001). However,
earlier case law also approved Departmental actions that consisted of nothing but
the offer of service. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981). Alaska law has
undergone a radical change on this issue since then.
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The second distinction that the Alaska Supreme Court has
drawn between active and reasonable efforts is that “active efforts”
is the higher standard. For example, when interpreting the former
Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) Rules, the court held that “active
55
efforts” is a “more stringent” burden than “reasonable efforts.”
After passage of the 1998 revisions to Alaska CINA statutes, the
56
court continued to cite the “more stringent protections of ICWA”
57
and referred to the “high standards of ICWA.”
The final distinction that the court has drawn between active
and reasonable efforts is that active efforts have a distinctly Indian
character. The year after the passage of the ICWA, the Bureau of
58
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) developed the meaning of “active efforts.”
Active efforts began to include a search for help from within the
59
Indian culture. Active efforts “shall take into account the prevailing social and cultural conditions and the way of life of the Indian child’s tribe. They shall involve and use the available resources of the extended family, the tribe, Indian social services
60
agencies, and individual Indian care givers.” The BIA extended
“individual Indian care givers” to include traditional healers and
other tribal members who have special skills “that can be used to
61
help the child’s family succeed.”
This essentially Indian character of active efforts has not been
extensively developed in Alaska case law. However, the Alaska
Supreme Court has cited tribal efforts to reunify when listing the

55. E.M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 959 P.2d 766, 768 (Alaska
1998) (interpreting former CINA Rule 15(g)).
56. C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Alaska
2001).
57. Id. at 1219; see also M.W., 20 P.3d at 1146 n.18 (imposing a “higher ‘active
efforts’ requirement”).
58. The BIA did not publish these guidelines as regulations because the
agency did not intend to make them binding. Guidelines for State Courts: Indian
Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26, 1979). The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has reviewed the guidelines for assistance when interpreting the ICWA. See, e.g., L.G. v State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 14 P.3d
946, 952, 954-55 (Alaska 2000); Adoption of N.P.S., 868 P.2d 934, 936 (Alaska
1994); Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. C.A.A., 783 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Alaska 1989) (per
curiam); Matter of Parental Rights of T.O., 759 P.2d 1308, 1309-10 (Alaska 1988)
(per curiam); D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774, 779 n.8 (Alaska 1985); D.A.W. v.
State, 699 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1985) (per curiam).
59. Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26, 1979).
60. Id. at 67,592.
61. Id.
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services that comprised “active efforts” toward unifying a parent
and child.62
3. Applying the Federal Standard. The application of the active efforts standard to specific cases has shown the Alaska Supreme Court’s insistence on accurate information about the parent’s willingness and ability to care for the child. Notwithstanding
this insistence, the court frequently has found that the Department
has provided active efforts. Where the parent has shown an unwillingness to accept parental duties, courts have found that the
Department has met the active efforts standard.
63
For example, Matter of J.W. indirectly addressed the Department’s duty to make active efforts by addressing the corresponding question of the parent’s duty to cooperate with the Department.
In particular, the court held that a parent’s
unwillingness to participate in rehabilitation may be considered
64
when determining the sufficiency of the State’s active efforts. The
Department may not assume, however, that a lack of willingness
exists until active efforts to provide remedial and rehabilitative
65
services have been made.
In Matter of J.W., parental rights were terminated after the
66
child had been in custody for about five years. Over a two-year
period, the Division of Family and Youth Services (“DFYS”) contacted the parent, who was addicted to alcohol, and provided serv67
ices aimed at helping him overcome his alcoholism. DFYS took
steps to supplement the father’s treatment while incarcerated and
68
to facilitate his treatment after release. DFYS continued to help
by transporting him to meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous and referring him to a Native sobriety group. Before the father was released from a halfway house, DFYS also contacted a substance
abuse officer who was assigned to the apartments where the father
69
was planning to live. After the father was released and subsequently relapsed, social workers tried several times to contact
70
him. Additionally, they continued to do such things as set up
62. N.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597, 603 (Alaska
2001) (citing services offered by a tribal organization).
63. 921 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1996).
64. Id. at 610.
65. Id. at 609.
66. Id. at 605-06.
67. Id. at 609-10.
68. Id. at 610.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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telephone visitation between the father and his children.71 The Department reduced its efforts after two years, but the court felt this
reduction was justified because the parent had shown an unwilling72
ness to participate in remedial efforts.
Even on these facts, the court expressed some disapproval of
DFYS’s efforts, suggesting that “arguably” their actions were not
73
sufficiently active to satisfy the ICWA. The court pointed out
that DFYS only initiated contact with the father after one of his
74
children asked about him. DFYS did not follow up on the father’s
75
treatment program and failed to contact the treatment center. In
other words, DFYS “simply relied on the court system” to assure
76
the follow-through. Moreover, the social workers never contacted
the state district attorney’s office or the local city attorney’s office
77
regarding the father’s compliance. When the father left the program, DFYS did not obtain a discharge summary, nor did it make
an attempt to coordinate efforts with the city regarding the father’s
78
failure to complete treatment. These efforts violated the unifying
principle—the Department’s inaction threatened the ability of the
court to determine what the parent could or could not do toward
rebuilding his household. However, despite its apparent doubts,
the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s findings of
79
reasonable and active efforts.
In D.H. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services80 the court
concluded that Departmental efforts to assist a mother to enroll in
and complete drug rehabilitation satisfied the active efforts re81
quirement. After the child was taken into custody, the Department tried to help the mother “in her expressed desire to participate in a substance abuse treatment program. This effort included
various evaluations and programs, all of which [the mother] left
82
prior to completion.” The supreme court concluded that “the
State’s attempts to assist [the mother] in enrolling and completing
drug rehabilitation programs” qualified as active efforts under the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
929 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1996).
Id. at 650.
Id. at 652.
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ICWA.83 The court also received favorably the Department’s arguments that it made active and reasonable efforts by placing the
84
child in relatives’ homes so the mother could stay with the child.
85
In E.M. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services, the trial
court found “huge, almost embarrassing efforts” to provide help to
86
the parents. The supreme court found that the Department had
provided adequate remedial services and rehabilitative programs
by arranging visits with the children and also by offering the parents counseling, a Male Awareness Program, urinalysis, money and
87
bus passes.
A parent’s incarceration affects the level of services that the
Department must offer, but it does not excuse the Department
88
from making active efforts. In A.M. I, the court responded to a
parent’s incarceration in two ways. First, the court found that incarceration is a legitimate consideration when the Department and
89
the trial court consider what services are possible. Second, the
court found that incarceration must be distinguished from a paren90
tal unwillingness to cooperate. Without expressly stating the nature of the distinction, the court in a later case assumed that because a prisoner is much less able to take advantage of services, the
91
Department’s burden of making active efforts is reduced, but the
court pointed out that incarceration does not eliminate entirely the
92
duty to provide active efforts. The court also held that the length
of the sentence is related to the minimum level of services that will
93
constitute active efforts. The unstated implication was that the
longer the sentence, the lower the Departmental burden.
The Department has no duty to provide active efforts to the
father until paternity is established and its own delay in identifying
the father does not mean that the Department has failed to make
94
active efforts. Under the ICWA, “parent” does not include an
unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or es-

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 655.
Id. at 655 n.15.
E.M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 959 P.2d 766 (Alaska 1998).
Id. at 769.
Id. at 770 n.6.
A.M. I, 891 P.2d 815, 827 (Alaska 1995).
Id.
Id.
A.A. v. State, 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999).
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 261.
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tablished.95 For example, in A.A. v. State, the father did not acknowledge paternity before the blood test established it, and so the
96
Department owed him no duty of active efforts. The court upheld
the finding of active efforts, but disapproved of the Department’s
failure to arrange a case plan, calling its efforts “relatively pas97
sive.” The lack of a plan was made irrelevant because of the father’s history of unwillingness to participate in any treatment and
98
his history of violent behavior while incarcerated.
99
In N.A. v. State, the supreme court found active efforts where
the Department worked with several different programs to evaluate and provide treatment for the parent’s addiction and mental
100
health problems. The supreme court listed many services that the
Department provided over several years before parental rights
101
N.A. is an excellent illustration in which the
were terminated.
Department provided sufficient services to ensure the trial court
that the proposed termination of parental rights was based upon
objective information about a particular parent’s willingness to
102
parent a particular child.
4. The Court’s Current Discontent. In three 2001 decisions,
the court showed more dissatisfaction with the Department’s efforts. The court found for the parent in one case, and in the second, two Justices dissented from a ruling in favor of the Department. In the third decision, the court extended the duty of active
efforts to private petitioners in adoption cases where an Indian
child is involved.
The court found a lack of active efforts in C.J. v. State, Dep’t of
103
Health and Social Services. However, the court found several interrelated problems, and it is difficult to isolate the absence of ac-

95. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2000).
96. A.A., 982 P.2d at 262.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. N.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 19 P.3d 597 (Alaska 2001).
100. Id. at 603 (stating that the “state’s efforts were more than active; they were
exemplary”).
101. Id. at 598-99.
102. In 2001, the court again addressed the situation where the parent faced
addiction and mental health problems and found that the Department had made
active efforts by its detailed attention to these problems over a period of years.
V.S.B. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 2001 WL 1635939, Op.No. 5517
(Alaska Dec. 21, 2001), amended on other grounds by V.S.B. v. State, Dep’t of
Health & Soc. Servs., 2002 WL 227310, Op.No. 5537 (Alaska Feb. 15, 2002).
103. 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska 2001).
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tive efforts as the factor that ultimately persuaded the court. The
court found a departmental failure to prove several elements of 25
U.S.C. section 1912, as well as a lack of expert testimony, a failure
to show that negative parental conduct would likely continue and
104
an agency failure to make active efforts at reunification.
The primary focus of the court was on the absence of any serious Departmental inquiry about the parent’s true situation. The
children were taken into custody in Alaska, but the parent lived in
105
Florida and was trying to establish a household there. The Department seemed satisfied to let Florida authorities handle the
case. As a result, at the Alaska trial on the petition to terminate
parental rights, the Department’s witnesses offered only unsupported hearsay reports from the Florida social workers about what
106
Firsthand information
the parent was doing or failing to do.
about the parent was absent, and the court refused to find that
107
statutory standards had been met.
The Department’s failure to obtain reports directly from the
parent or to seek confirmation of the Florida reports affected the
expert witness testimony and the determination of active efforts.
The expert witness offered only generalizations about the effect of
parental absence on a child and failed to address the particular
108
situation of these children and this specific parent. As a result of
the witness’s failure to discuss the specific facts of the case, the testimony was found insufficient to meet the standards of the
109
ICWA. Additionally, the Department’s failure to inquire about
the parent’s situation in Florida was compounded by the court’s
110
Alfinding that the Department made only “minimal efforts.”
though the court did not suggest what services might have been offered, it expressed clear dissatisfaction with the efforts made.
111
The facts of T.F. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services
divided the court. Here, the issue was the balance between the
duty of the Department to make active efforts and the duty of the
parent to cooperate with those efforts. On several levels, the
opinion throws uncertainty into a fairly settled and consistent set of
interpretive rules.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
2001).
111.

Id. at 1217-19.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1218-19.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1218.
Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Alaska
26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001).
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The facts were not in doubt, but their interpretation was
sharply contested. The majority paid special attention to which
party was responsible for each delay that occurred throughout the
112
termination proceedings. The decision to assign merit and blame
to virtually every step in the case produced a meticulous recitation
of the facts that is difficult to outline. The major events are summarized as follows: the Department took twin girls from their
113
mother a few days after their birth in July 1999. In early August,
the Department learned that the putative father, T.F., was incarcerated. The agency moved for a paternity test, which the court
114
ordered for October 13, 1999. By that date, however, the father
115
had fled custody.
The father returned to police custody on November 7, 1999,116
and the Department filed its petition to terminate parental rights
117
The father appeared for the paternity
on November 15, 1999.
test on December 28, 1999, and the confirming results arrived Feb118
In an exchange where two opinions seldom
ruary 29, 2000.
agreed on the significance of certain facts, both the majority and
the dissent concluded that the duty to make active efforts was trig119
gered by the determination that T.F. was indeed the father.
On March 1, 2000, the social worker wrote to the father, informing him that the girls were his biological children, and the fa120
ther then asked for visitation. Three weeks before the termination trial, the social worker, the father’s attorney and the father
121
met, and prepared a case plan. While incarcerated, the father be122
gan taking classes in parenting and fetal alcohol syndrome. The
social worker supervised several visits between the father and the
123
Despite these efforts on the father’s part, the superior
twins.
124
court terminated his parental rights at a trial in April 2000. The

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 1090-92.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1091.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1095, 1097.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1095.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
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supreme court upheld the trial court finding that the Department
had made active efforts.125
The majority reiterated its previous ruling that a Departmental delay in determining paternity was not itself a violation of the
126
active efforts requirement. The majority saw the father’s failure
to appear for the first paternity test as an intentional refusal to cooperate and, in its implications, virtually dispositive. The overall
principle of T.F. is that, in advancing the goal of protecting children, the court will require the parent to cooperate with active efforts before it finds fault with a Departmental failure to act.
The dissent, however, criticized the majority’s decision as “one
127
strike and you’re out.” The majority denied that the analogy to
criminal law was appropriate, but it did not deny that its ruling had
serious consequences for the father. Further, the majority did not
see this rule as punitive: “Rather, it is driven by the policy of pro128
Custody by either parent was
tecting children in need of aid.”
likely to result in serious harm to the children, and further delay in
the case would have been “detrimental to their welfare and best in129
terests.”
The majority approved of the Department’s active efforts.
The Department scheduled two paternity tests, attempted to contact the father during his absence, supervised three visits with his
children, contacted his probation officer to make sure that he was
enrolled in appropriate classes and met with him to discuss his
130
In relation to previous children’s cases, this list is fairly
case.
modest and illustrates the extent to which incarceration and noncooperation reduce the Department’s duty to the parent.
The dissent reasoned as follows: because the ICWA imposes a
duty of active efforts and requires that those efforts be found unsuccessful, sufficient time must be allowed for those efforts to fail
131
The only active effort that failed was the Departor succeed.
ment’s attempt to allow the father to establish paternity by setting
up the October 1999 paternity test. Thus the question was whether

125. Id. at 1093-94.
126. See id. at 1092 (citing A.A. v. State, 982 P.2d 256, 262 (Alaska 1999)).
127. Id. at 1099.
128. Id. at 1095.
129. Id. (citing the superior court opinion) (internal quotations omitted).
130. Id. at 1095 n.28. The paternity tests thus played two roles. The scheduling
of the tests satisfied the active efforts requirement because it was designed to locate a father; then the test results, once positive, created a new set of Department
duties, this time to a specific man.
131. Id. at 1098.
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that failure, in and of itself, relieved the Department of any further
duty to make additional efforts.132
The dissent argued that the Department had not fulfilled its
133
The father was responsible for a
duty to make active efforts.
three-week delay when he absconded from custody, but the Department delayed in scheduling a second paternity test for seven
134
weeks after he returned. The dissent argued that “[t]he underlying idea of subsection 1912(d) is that troubled and situationally unfit parents should receive rehabilitative services so that they may
be able to fulfill traditional parental roles. In the process of receiving rehabilitative services, some false starts and setbacks are to
135
be expected.” According to the dissent, treating one missed appointment as a discharge of the active duty requirement is inconsis136
tent with the purposes of the ICWA.
The dissent argued that the Department’s efforts did not meet
137
the requirements of the ICWA. The dissent described the extent
of DFYS’s efforts: “What DFYS did was to formulate a case plan
138
and arrange three visits between [the father] and the children.”
The case plan itself could not qualify as an effort toward reunifica139
tion because its stated goal was adoption. The dissent agreed that
arranging for and monitoring the father’s attendance at prison
classes might qualify as active efforts; however, these classes began
140
so close to trial that they had no reasonable chance of success.
The dissent also pointed out that the trial court made no finding
141
that active efforts as to the father had been unsuccessful. Before
parental rights may be terminated, the party seeking to create a
foster care placement must satisfy the court that active efforts have
142
been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The trial
court found that the father had failed to cooperate, but this finding
was directed at his failure to appear at a paternity test that was
143
scheduled during the time he had absconded from custody. The
father cooperated at all times after his paternity was established,

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1098-99.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
T.F. v. State, 26 P.3d 1089, 1097 (Alaska 2001).
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and the trial court never found that these later efforts were unsuccessful.144 The dissent argued the trial court failed to adequately
consider these later efforts.
Under the ICWA, the party proposing the foster care placement must satisfy the court that active reunification efforts have
145
been unsuccessful. The majority’s disregard of the “lack of success” issue is the question that creates the most uncertainty. The
trial court found that, even assuming “the speediest possible recovery by the parents,” the delay in permanent placement would be
146
too long for the girls, who urgently needed a stable family. That
finding is the only one cited by the majority that would address the
“lack of success” issue, even tangentially. The majority does not
offer its reasoning for disregarding the absence of this finding. The
unspoken rationale might run as follows: assume the “speediest
possible recovery” finding is correct—more delay would result in
irreparable harm. On this assumption, no level of parental success
in fulfilling case plan requirements would ever be adequate because even the shortest amount of time leading to that success
would still injure the child. Thus, even a successful parental outcome would still cause emotional and physical harm to the child; by
the majority’s definition, this is a lack of success at rehabilitation.
This line of reasoning is not explicitly stated in the court’s
opinion. However, if the trial court’s failure to make an affirmative
finding of a lack of success is covered by its finding that no parental
recovery could ever be short enough, then such a train of assumptions and implications seems to be the only possible basis for making such a presumption valid. Yet the majority failed to articulate
why it was willing to disregard the absence of a “lack of success”
finding.
The dissent observed that the Department put this case on the
147
fast track in response to the legislative changes of 1998. But this
speed prevented active efforts from succeeding. The dissent noted
that “under ICWA lack of success is a precondition to termination.
Termination cannot serve as the reason why active efforts fail to
148
succeed.” Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, “the requirements of ICWA must be observed even if
144. Id. at 1097-98.
145. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). Other rights under the ICWA require a “determination . . . that continued custody . . . is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-(f).
146. Id. at 1092.
147. Id. at 1098; 1998 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 99 (substantially revising ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie 2000)).
148. T.F., 26 P.3d at 1098.
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that means some slippage in the state statutory scheduling requirements.”149
T.F. creates a great deal of uncertainty in Alaska child protection law. The court disregarded several earlier cases that had
formed a fairly coherent set of interpretive rules. Before T.F.,
when ruling under state law, the Alaska Supreme Court insisted
that trial courts affirmatively make findings required by court
150
rule. Because the party proposing foster care must demonstrate
the lack of success of reunification efforts to know whether the
court was satisfied by the proof at trial, there must be some affirmative finding for the benefit of the parties and the appellate
151
The supreme court disregarded its previous findings recourt.
quirement without explaining why it did so.
Before T.F., the court held that the Department may not pre152
In T.F.,
sume that efforts at reunification will be unsuccessful.
the supreme court upheld the trial court’s finding that the Department made active efforts at reunification after only six weeks of
153
T.F. does not negate prior Alaska case law, but
such efforts.
rather dilutes it substantially. After T.F., the Department is nominally forbidden to presume a lack of success but now may undertake active efforts on a schedule that effectively precludes any
chance of success before trial.
T.F. is a throwback to the 1970’s, when removing the child
from abusive parents was the only goal of the system and family
reunification generally was not an important consideration. In
T.F., nearly all factors that might raise doubt that the court’s termination of parental rights was correct were subordinated to the
154
goal of child protection. This goal is legitimate, without question,
but the ICWA also declares a policy of Indian family preserva155
tion. The T.F. majority did not explain why the goal of reunification carries such little weight in relation to the goal of child protection.
The T.F. opinion does not fit the pattern that the Alaska Supreme Court had previously followed. Earlier opinions on the “efforts” issues could be joined by a single principle that the purpose
149. Id.
150. Matter of J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166, 172 (Alaska 1992). Later cases held that
the requirement to make findings was met if the trial court directly addressed and
resolved the issue.
151. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
152. A.M. I, 891 P.2d 815, 826-27 (Alaska 1995).
153. T.F. v. State, 26 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Alaska 2001).
154. Id. at 1096.
155. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(2) (2000).
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of the Department’s efforts was to avoid a momentary and subjective picture of the parent and thus permit a decision that would reunify parent and child when circumstances allowed. T.F. calls that
principle into doubt by emphasizing the negative factors of incarceration and parental noncooperation.
Near the end of 2001, the Alaska Supreme Court returned to
its traditional interpretation that the ICWA requirements are present to protect the parent and that the trial court must directly and
specifically address the question of future parental behavior. D.J.
156
v. P.C. applied the ICWA to private adoptions where the adoptee
is an Indian child. The court noted that the duty to make active efforts extended to the private petitioner, the maternal grandmother,
157
who was the child’s Indian custodian. The father, who disputed
the adoption, was serving a jail sentence of twenty years for at158
The court reiterated earlier rulings that altempted murder.
though incarceration may diminish the level of active efforts, incarceration does not eliminate the duty of the Department to make
159
such efforts. The supreme court addressed the trial court’s generalized finding that because the father was incarcerated, the active
efforts requirement had been met “to the extent necessary, under
160
the circumstances of this case.” The supreme court indicated that
such a finding was insufficient and required that the question of active efforts, and their success or failure, be specifically addressed in
161
the trial court decision.
5. Confusion over the Degree of Cooperation. The Alaska Supreme Court has taken a dim view of parents who fail to cooperate
162
with their case plans and then argue a lack of active efforts. A
parent’s unwillingness to cooperate with a case plan reduces the
163
Department’s duty to continue to provide such efforts. By contrast, the parent’s willingness to cooperate and to prepare for the

156. 36 P.3d 663 (Alaska 2001).
157. Id. at 673.
158. Id. at 666.
159. Id. at 673 nn.53 & 54 (citing A.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs.,
982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999) and A.M. I, 891 P.2d 815, 827 (Alaska 1995).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., N.A. v. State, 19 P.3d 597, 603 (Alaska 2001) (citing earlier
cases).
163. A.M. I, 891 P.2d at 827 (citing earlier cases).
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return of the child are factors indicating that negative parental
conduct is less likely to continue.164
However, the court has sent contrasting signals about cooperation and its relationship to the active efforts requirement. In A.H.
165
v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services the father asserted on
appeal that although the Department had made active efforts,
those efforts were not reasonable because the programs offered
were so stressful and intense that they caused the parents increasingly to “isolate themselves . . . from the services available to
166
them.” Although prior decisions imply that if a parent concedes
the larger question of active efforts, he or she will automatically
lose on the narrower question of reasonable efforts, the supreme
court in A.H. did not mention such a relationship between the two
standards. Rather, the court recognized that the “reasonable ef167
forts” issue was also present and required resolution.
In A.H. at least fourteen different organizations offered to
help the parents before the children were removed, and the parents
168
received additional help after removal. The father argued on appeal that the large array of services was very stressful and that “the
169
intensity of [the family’s] program schedule was not reasonable.”
DFYS and other agencies had provided services to the father in the
areas where there was some concern about his “parenting, domes170
tic violence, and mental health.” The agencies coordinated their
171
efforts so that all services occurred during three days each week.
The court’s opinion implies that this level of intensity is not so
stressful as to excuse participation in the Department’s active efforts. The court concluded that this level of services, in relation to
the father’s willingness to accept them, was sufficient to demon172
strate both reasonable and active efforts.
By itself, the A.H. ruling is unremarkable. But A.H. appears
to have implicitly overruled earlier case law. In A.M. v. State
(“A.M. II”), the court wrote, “We have never suggested that the
scope of the State’s duty to make active remedial efforts should be
affected by a parent’s motivation or prognosis before remedial ef164.
2001).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214, 1218-19 (Alaska
10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000).
Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id. at 1164-65.
Id. at 1165.
Id.
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forts have commenced.”173 A.H. purported to rely on A.M. II, but
in A.H. the court dropped the initial phrase, “[w]e have never sug174
gested,” from the above-quoted statement. The omission of the
opening phrase reversed the meaning of the quote, which then read
as follows: “the scope of the State’s duty to make active remedial
efforts should be affected by a parent’s motivation or prognosis be175
It seems likely, howfore remedial efforts have commenced.”
ever, that A.H.’s omission of part of the quote is an error. The
Alaska Supreme Court has consistently recognized the duty of active efforts and has not excused such efforts in the absence of some
attempt at reunification. A.M. I held, for example, that
to vary the scope of the State’s ICWA duty based on subjective,
pre-intervention criteria such as a parent’s motivation or treatment prognosis might defeat the purpose of the active remedial
efforts requirement, for it would enable the State to argue, in all
doubtful and difficult
cases, that it had no duty to make active
176
remedial efforts.

By contrast, the revised quote from A.H. implies that the adequacy of active efforts can be determined before such efforts begin.
A.H. would stand alone in Alaska law if it created such a doctrine.
Thus, it is highly likely that A.M. I still represents the court’s
thinking on its refusal to define the scope of active efforts without
177
first offering the parent the opportunity to cooperate.
B.

“Reasonable Efforts” Becomes Part of the Legal Landscape

1. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.
Much of today’s child dependency law took shape in 1980 with the
passage of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
178
(“AACWA”). The AACWA created both the goal of reunification of non-Indian children with the family and the “reasonable efforts” requirement:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it
shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which . . . provides
173. 945 P.2d at 304 (quoting A.M. I, 891 P.2d 815, 827 (Alaska 1995)).
174. Id.
175. A.H., 10 P.3d at 1164 n.25.
176. A.M. I, 891 P.2d at 827.
177. The court later relied on A.M. I when describing a petitioner’s duty to the
parent in private adoption cases. D.J. v. P.C., 36 P.3d 663, 678, n.54 (Alaska 2001).
The court’s use of A.M. I further suggests that while incarceration affects the feasibility of different kinds of active efforts, a presumed lack of success, by itself,
cannot reduce the scope of such efforts.
178. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to
the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate
the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to
179
make it possible for the child to return to his home.

Federal funds could be used to design and operate a program to
“help children remain with their families and where appropriate
180
AACWA required that
help children return to their families.”
the case plan include “a plan of services which will be provided in
order to improve family conditions and facilitate returning the
181
child to his home.”
2. AACWA Leaves the Active Efforts Requirements Untouched. Although AACWA created a second “efforts” test, it did
182
In fact, AACWA
not affect the existing test under the ICWA.
made no reference to the ICWA. Thus, the two parallel “efforts”
tests began. The absence of cross-references makes the two more
difficult to compare but also makes clear that they are separate;
183
one does not modify the other.
Additionally, the only provision of AACWA that affected Indian parents was a later amendment that effectively strengthened
184
the ICWA requirements. In 1994, Congress amended AACWA
to require that state plans for child welfare services “contain a description, developed after consultation with tribal organizations . . .
in the State, of the specific measures taken by the State to comply
185
with the Indian Child Welfare Act.” The amendments did not alter the substantive requirements of the ICWA.
Furthermore, if a conflict existed between the requirements of
these two child welfare laws, rules of statutory construction require
that the ICWA would govern because, in the absence of some
statement of congressional intent, a specific statute controls a gen179. Id. § 101, 94 Stat. 501-03 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(Supp.
1999)).
180. S. REP. NO. 96-336, at 4 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1448, 1453.
181. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-900, at 46 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1561, 1566.
182. DAVID SIMMONS & JACK TROPE, NAT’L INDIAN WELFARE ASS’N, INC.,
P.L. 105-89 ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT OF 1997: ISSUES FOR TRIBES AND
STATES SERVING INDIAN CHILDREN 10-12, available at http://www.
muskie.usm.maine.edu/helpkids/newpub.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
183. For this analysis, I am indebted to the work of the National Indian Child
Welfare Association (“NICWA”). This comparison of ICWA and AACWA
tracks NICWA’s commentary on this issue. See id.
184. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 103-437, §
204, 108 Stat. 4398, 4456 (1994) (amended at 42 U.S.C. § 622(b) (Supp. 1999)).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(ii) (Supp. 1999).
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eral statute, regardless of which is enacted first.186 Here, AACWA
and its amendments deal with all children who are in state custody,
regardless of ethnicity. The ICWA deals with Indian children specifically. Additionally, statutes intended for the benefit of Indians
187
are liberally construed to accomplish that purpose.
3. “Reasonable Efforts” in Alaska Law from 1980 to 1998.
The phrase “reasonable efforts” was slow to appear in Alaska law.
A comprehensive revision of the CINA Rules included the term
188
The first express reference to
for the first time only in 1987.
AACWA did not appear in the CINA Rules until a rule regarding
189
The requirements of
temporary custody was amended in 1989.
AACWA were not thoroughly woven into the CINA Rules until
1990, when the Alaska Supreme Court amended four rules to in190
clude reasonable efforts findings.
Opinions after the 1990 rule change underscored the court’s
continued caution with the “reasonable efforts” requirement. Although the court has felt free to disapprove of departmental practices, the court has yet to overturn a judgment that found a failure
to make reasonable efforts. This result contrasts with the court’s
review of “active efforts,” where the court has overturned an order
based on the Department’s failure to make active efforts to reunify
191
the family under the ICWA.
The first opinion issued after the 1990 rule change held only
that the trial court must make the findings required by the rule. In
192
J.L.F. v. State, the mother appealed a superior court decision
terminating her parental rights, arguing that the Department’s re193
unification plan was unreasonable. The trial court, however, had
not made any findings on whether the Department plan was rea194
sonable, leaving no substantive issue for appellate review. Thus,
the supreme court noted that reunification efforts must be reason-

186. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
187. Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); John v.
Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 1999).
188. Alaska Supreme Court Order 845 (eff. Aug. 15, 1987).
189. Alaska Supreme Court Order 914 (eff. Jan. 15, 1989).
190. Alaska Supreme Court Order 1010 (eff. Jan. 15, 1990).
191. See C.J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 18 P.3d 1214 (Alaska
2001).
192. 828 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1992), overruled on other grounds by In re S.A., 912
P.2d 1235 (1996).
193. Id. at 167, 171.
194. See id. at 172.
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able and that the trial court must affirmatively find them as such;
the court then remanded the case for a resolution of this issue.195
In F.T. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services196 the supreme court addressed the implications of seemingly conflicting
trial court findings on whether the State had met the “reasonable
197
The trial court originally compared the Deefforts” standard.
partment’s actions to the reasonable efforts requirements of former
CINA Rule 15(g), which required such findings at the time of the
child’s removal from the home, and found that reasonable efforts
198
had not been made. Given the absence of a reasonable reunification plan, the trial court held that it could not reach the next ques199
tion: whether the parent’s harmful conduct was likely to continue.
The inference drawn by the trial court—that the absence of reunification efforts prevented a finding on the issue of likely future parental conduct—was not tested on appeal. However, the trial court
ruling was sensible: the absence of Departmental efforts made it
impossible to know what the parents would have done in the presence of such efforts. The trial court ordered that the Department
200
Later, howwork with the father on visitation and counseling.
ever, the trial court made the affirmative finding of reasonable ef201
forts by the Department. The supreme court upheld this finding
and stated that “[t]here was no inconsistency between the orders
because [the second] order can be read to reflect the State’s efforts
202
at promoting visitation in the wake of [the first] order.”
4. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. The Adop203
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”) amended two titles
of the Social Security Act and created the current federal framework for administration of child dependency cases. As in the case
of AACWA, ASFA does not directly impose a duty of reasonable
efforts, but rather the “reasonable efforts” requirement remains a
precondition for federal funding. ASFA extensively changed the

195. Id. In later cases, the court held that the requirement to make findings
was met so long as the trial court directly addressed and resolved the issue. See,
e.g., R.R. v. State, 919 P.2d 754, 755-56 (Alaska 1996); In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941,
944-45 (Alaska 1994).
196. 922 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).
197. Id. at 281.
198. Id. at 279.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 279, 281.
202. Id. at 281.
203. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).

ANDREWS_FMT.DOC

05/01/02 9:45 AM

2002] “ACTIVE” VERSUS “REASONABLE” EFFORTS

111

wording of the reasonable efforts requirement and clarified several
issues left unanswered by AACWA:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it
shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which—
provides that—
(A) in determining reasonable efforts to be made with respect to a child, as described in this paragraph, in making such
reasonable efforts, the child’s health and safety shall be the
paramount concern;
(B) . . . reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families—
(i) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent
or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s
home; and
(ii) to204make it possible for a child to safely return to the child’s
home.

As noted, “reasonable efforts” was not defined by AACWA in
1980, and federal law has not defined it since. The United States
Department of Health and Human Services has issued a set of
principles to help the states and Indian tribes develop services to
children and families. Many of these principles are similar to the
definition of “family support services” that appeared in the 1998
205
These rules are only guidelines.
revision of the Alaska statutes.
In Alaska the substantive content of “reasonable efforts” finds its
source entirely in state law. As in the case of AACWA in 1980, the
ASFA is silent regarding the ICWA.
5. 1998 Revision of the Alaska Statutes. Defining a reasonable
efforts standard in Alaska has clearly posed a challenge. In 1996,
the Alaska Judicial Council noted the difficulty of drafting a uniform standard for reasonable efforts: “[a] reasonable efforts finding
necessarily depends upon resources available in a community, and
other variables that militate against a universal standard for the
206
findings.” Despite the size and complexity of this problem, Congress, the state legislature and the Alaska judiciary have created a
discernible pattern of how the “efforts” requirements will be interpreted and what the requirements are intended to accomplish.
Among other things, the 1998 Alaska law revisions require services
204. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. 1999).
205. Compare 45 C.F.R. §§ 1355, 1356 (2000), with ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.990(9) (Michie 2000).
206. TERESA W. CARNS ET AL., IMPROVING THE COURT PROCESS FOR ALASKA’S
CHILDREN IN NEED OF AID 98 (1999), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us
/Reports/cina96.pdf (citations omitted) (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
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to be provided in each individual community,207 a provision which
goes a long way toward adapting the standard to a state with diverse communities.
In response to ASFA, the 1998 Alaska State Legislature substantially redrafted the state’s child welfare and juvenile delin208
quency laws. These amendments addressed many questions left
unanswered in federal law. The 1998 revisions were so extensive
that today there is much less disparity between departmental duties
when the child in custody is an Indian and when the child is a nonIndian. The new duties under Alaska law are worded very differently from those in the ICWA, but the net effect is to move the
standard of “reasonable efforts” much closer to that of “active efforts.”
With the revisions, the statute now states:
[With certain exceptions] the department shall make timely, reasonable efforts to provide family support services to the child
and to the parents or guardian of the child that are designed to
prevent out-of-home placement of the child or to enable the safe
return of the child to the family home, when appropriate . . . .
The department’s duty to make reasonable efforts under this
subsection includes the duty to
(1) identify family support services that will assist the parent or
guardian in remedying the conduct or conditions in the home
that made the child a child in need of aid;
(2) actively offer the parent or guardian, and refer the parent or
guardian to, the services identified under (1) of this subsection;
the department shall refer the parent or guardian to communitybased family support services whenever community-based services are available and desired by the parent or guardian; and
(3) document the department’s
actions that are taken under (1)
209
and (2) of this subsection.

Within this broader duty, the statute further refines the individual
terms:
“[R]easonable efforts” means, with respect to family support
services required under [Alaska Statutes section] 47.10.086, consistent attempts made during a reasonable time period and time210
limited services.
“[R]easonable time” means a period of time that serves the
best interests of the child, taking in account the affected child’s

207.
208.
209.
210.

ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.990(9) (Michie 2000).
1998 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 99.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086(a) (Michie 2000).
Id. § 47.10.990(22).
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age, emotional and developmental needs, and ability to form and
211
maintain lasting attachments.
“[F]amily support services” means the services and activities
provided to children and their families, including those provided
by the community, a church, or other service organization, both
to prevent removal of a child from the parental home and to facilitate the child’s safe return to the family; “family support
services” may include counseling, substance abuse treatment,
mental health services, assistance to address domestic violence,
visitation with family members, parenting classes, in-home serv212
ices, temporary child care services, and transportation.

For the parent, the exercise of these rights requires a line-by-line
and word-by-word analysis of the text of the statute. Have the efforts been consistent? Are the services community-based? Are
the time periods reasonable in relation to what the Department
213
expects the parent to accomplish? The inventory of services echoes the hypothetical list of services that the Alaska Supreme Court
offered in In re S.D., Jr. in 1976, the first opinion to suggest that
there might be such a thing as reasonable efforts and what the
214
standard might be.
The Alaska Supreme Court amended the CINA Rules in 1999
to reflect the 1998 legislative changes; almost every rule was affected. As noted above, the trial court findings of reasonable ef215
forts are required throughout the custody proceeding. The 1998
statute revolutionized the nature of the affirmative duties owed to
the parents. Twenty years earlier, the mere existence of case plans
with duties to the parents was a rarity. Today the case plan itself is
mandatory, and it is much clearer when the Department’s duties
arise and what they must specifically include.
6. The Alaska Supreme Court and Reasonable Efforts Since
1998. Since 1998, the Alaska Supreme Court’s analysis continues
to be what it has been: a straightforward comparison of the language of the statute with the actions of the Department. However,
the legal context has changed dramatically. Where nothing existed
before by which to evaluate the action of the Department, there is

211. Id § 47.10.990(23).
212. Id. § 47.10.990(9).
213. For more information pertaining to this question, see Sheri L. Hazeltine,
Speedy Termination of Alaska Native Parental Rights: the 1998 Changes to
Alaska’s Child in Need Aid Statutes and Their Inherent Conflict with the Mandates
of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, in this edition of the Alaska Law Review.
214. 549 P.2d 1190, 1199 n.29 (Alaska 1976).
215. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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now a comprehensive set of duties that the Department owes the
parent and child. The court’s opinions have reflected that change.
In each of the cases since 1998, the parent’s lack of cooperation with the Department’s efforts was virtually dispositive of the
question of reasonable efforts. This response to a lack of cooperation fits the overall principle of straightforward comparison, as the
parent’s unwillingness to change his or her behavior demonstrates,
as clearly as any evidence could, the unlikelihood that this parent
will ever help create a reasonably stable household. Whatever the
duty of “reasonable efforts” might include, a parent’s challenge on
appeal of the Department’s actions will not survive the parent’s refusal to cooperate.
216
In A.B. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services the trial
court found that reasonable efforts had been made, and the su217
preme court affirmed. The court cited “DFYS’s efforts in creating the case plan and offering [the mother] services that would help
218
The opinion lists the
her achieve the objectives of that plan.”
specific help the Department offered: help with filling out housing
applications, creating a case plan, arranging visitation and designing a treatment plan for substance abuse and mental health prob219
lems. The mother either refused such help or failed to follow up
220
on it.
The mother argued that her failure to participate was based on
a justifiable cause. She argued that “her failure to comply with her
case plan was not fully voluntary because the failure was caused by
221
her poverty and her homelessness.” The mother refused help in
finding housing and did not offer evidence to show that it was her
222
The supreme court
poverty that caused her to refuse housing.
acknowledged that the mother was “extremely poor” during the
relevant time period but also noted that the Department and other
organizations gave the mother an opportunity for a stable lifestyle
223
and that the mother declined those opportunities.
When the parent fails to contact anyone connected with his
child’s case, the Department’s efforts are reasonable when they
consist of attempts to locate the parent, even if substantive services
are not offered. The court has reviewed two such cases recently in
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
Id. at 953.
Id.
Id. at 952-53.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 952.
Id.
Id.
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M.W. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services224 and C.W. v.
225
State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services.
In M.W., the father met with the social worker and discussed
226
the case plan, including the need for the parents to visit the child.
227
The father said that he understood the plan. He later objected to
not getting a copy of the plan, but then admitted that receiving a
228
The father then made
copy might not have made a difference.
himself unavailable for one year by neither visiting nor speaking
229
with the child. The social worker testified concerning her exten230
sive efforts to locate and contact the father during this time. The
supreme court found these efforts reasonable and held that when
making a reasonable efforts finding, the trial court may consider
231
the father’s unwillingness to participate in his case plan.
In C.W., the social worker located the parent and met with
232
him to discuss the case plan. The father then moved, losing contact for over three years with both the social worker and his own
233
234
lawyer. His parental rights were subsequently terminated. The
father argued on appeal that the Department had failed to make
reasonable efforts to accommodate his learning disability and his
235
alcohol abuse in order to enable him to be reunited with his child.
The father also argued that the Department had failed to make
reasonable efforts under the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (“ADA”) to avoid excluding him from the “services, pro236
grams, or activities of a public entity.”
The court found that the father’s long absence undermined his
237
In dearguments about reasonable efforts to provide services.
termining whether the Department was diligent in its continuing
attempts to locate the father, the court focused on whether the efforts to contact the father were reasonable and found that they

224. 20 P.3d 1141 (Alaska 2001).
225. 23 P.3d 52 (Alaska 2001).
226. M.W., 20 P.3d at 1143.
227. Id. at 1146.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1143.
230. Id. at 1146.
231. Id. (citing A.M. II, 945 P.2d 296, 305-06 (Alaska 1997), which was decided
under the ICWA).
232. C.W. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 23 P.3d 52, 53 (Alaska 2001).
233. Id. at 54.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12,132 (2000); C.W., 23 P.3d at 55 n.10.
237. C.W., 23 P.3d at 56.
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were.238 Therefore, no further need existed to address the question
of whether providing certain substantive services would have been
239
reasonable. As for the ADA claim, the court found that the father had failed to draw a connection between his learning disability
240
The disability claim had
and his abandonment of the children.
241
Moreover,
“no logical bearing” on the abandonment findings.
the father had also failed to challenge the adequacy of the case
242
plan at the first meeting with the social worker. Thus, the court’s
determination that the Department had met its burden of making
reasonable efforts to reunify the family despite its not having provided substantive services was influenced greatly by the father’s absence and lack of cooperation in the proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
On first review, the decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court
that address the “efforts” requirements of the ICWA and of
Alaska state law appear to be a fact-specific jumble of cases, virtually unrelated to each other. Generally, the court seems to be reinventing the wheel on each review of a CINA case. In fact, how243
ever, aside from T.F. v. State, Dep’t of Health and Social Services,
the Alaska Supreme Court has applied a single standard fairly consistently over the past quarter century: have the efforts of the Department objectively demonstrated an ongoing failure on the part
of the parent to provide basic care that reflects unwillingness to
serve as a parent? The court’s failure to succinctly articulate that
standard has created an appearance of uncertainty where it does
not exist.
Such a test would address each of the major questions that
come before the trial court. The ICWA requires the testimony of
244
an expert witness in order to terminate parental rights. Is the expert testimony sufficient to show an “objective” failure by this parent, or is the testimony merely a collection of generalities or based
on information exclusively from one source? Another question the
trial court must consider is whether the history of parental conduct
is sufficient to show an “ongoing” failure, or whether the period of
time covered by the testimony is too brief to allow a reliable pre-

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 53.
26 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2001).
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2000).
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diction of the future? These questions are relevant for every case.
For the future, the ruling in T.F., in which the court did not
consider the parent’s overall cooperation and participation to as
great an extent as it did in the other cases discussed, calls for clarification or reversal. The ruling interrupts a body of law that
worked well to permit termination of parental rights when the facts
so required, but also assured that accurate information about the
parent would be put before the court.

